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faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker," our increasingly political understandings of the rulemaking process, and current arguments respecting the
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overstate the ability of the President to legitimize the regulatory state. It accuses propresidentialists of premising their claims on a conception of the "will of the people"
that is neither an accurate description of how citizens actually participate in modern
government nor an authentic constitutional understanding of how citizens would consent to public policy decisions. The paper concludes by insisting that no single mode
of democratic legitimization can "save" the regulatory enterprise; rather, administrative law must look to a plurality of institutions and practices that contribute to an
ongoing process of legitimizing the administrative state.
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The most remarkable period since the adoption of the Administrative Procedure
Act was that from 1967-1983. During these years, the courts dramatically revised administrative common law in order to open up agency processes to new groups and
perspectives, and transferred significant authority from agencies to reviewing courts.
Since 1983, the tenor of judicial doctrine has been very different, with a turn toward
formalism, common law concepts, and a shift in authority back towards agencies. This
article seeks to explain these developments in terms of a progression of pessimism
about the administrative state. During the 1967-1983 period, courts saw agencies as
being vulnerable to capture by industry groups, but did not view legislative or judicial
processes as being similarly threatened. In the more recent period, all institutions of
government have been seen as being subject to interest group manipulation, with the
result that transferring authority from agencies to legislatures or courts no longer
holds much appeal.
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Professor Zeppos' paper examines the relationship between the legal profession
and the development of administrative law. The paper describes traditional accounts
of the legal profession's efforts to secure its power and status in society and applies the
traditional account to the rise of the administrative state. The paper then offers a
critique of the traditional account. While the traditional account offers a convincing
version of the profession's resistance to administrative government, it fails to address
certain questions or addresses them incompletely. Moreover, missing from the literature is a fuller description for the profession's eventual acceptance of administrative
law and assertion of jurisdiction over large parts of the field. This shift cannot be
explained solely by the successful imposition of an adjudicative model on administrative government. Rather, the shift from a predominantly common law regime to a
legal system controlled by statute and administrative law required a broader reconceptualization of the functions that lawyers perform.
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Administrative law scholars and practitioners take largely for granted the development of judicial review of agency action as essentially a process of federal common
law. Agencies are held responsible to comply not only with statutory and constitutional commands, but also to a more amorphous set of legal doctrines and principles
which represent standards of procedural regularity and substantive "reasonableness."
In his treatise, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, Professor Louis Jaffe described this independent, trans-statutory scrutiny as "one of the rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law." This paper examines the treatise in order to explore the key
conceptual move toward independent review in the administrative law scholarship of
the 1950s and 60s. A study of the elements of Jaffe's reformulation of the subject of
federal administrative law sheds light on current controversies regarding judicial review and its proper scope.
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In various contexts, Congress and courts have directed that agency action be unreviewable to prevent judicial second-guessing of certain discretionary administrative
acts. Yet, when agencies tie their own hands through regulations or directives, then

the courts have exercised review despite the discretionary resource questions otherwise involved. This paper explores the costs of predicating review on the agency's
failure to comply with prior rules and directives, and suggests alternative approaches
to minimize such costs.
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The famous case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) holds that
a reviewing court should evaluate an administrative agency's interpretation of its enabling legislation by first asking whether the statute has a clear meaning ("step one");
if the statute is ambiguous, the interpretation should be upheld if it is reasonable
("step two"). But if the agency's interpretation is not clearly contrary to the statute,
on what grounds could it be deemed unreasonable? Cases from the United States
Supreme Court, which has never set aside an agency action on the basis of step two,
do not answer this question. This article examines a line of D.C. Circuit cases that
tend to identify Chevron step two review with traditional "arbitrary and capricious"
review. The article defends this approach and suggests that it offers a better solution
to the problem of giving meaning to step two than any of the salient alternatives.
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We use the term discretion all the time to describe the role of judges and administrators, but it is in fact a rather empty concept. Perhaps medieval barons or Ottoman
satraps had "discretion"; in a modem state, the more relevant question is the extent to
which particular government agents are supervised, the mode of that supervision, and
their role in formulating public policy. The advantage of this change of terminology is
illustrated by a case study of bank regulation in Germany, where the administrator's
denial that they exercise discretion, in circumstances where we would say that they
definitely do, indicates that the term is being used, by both Germans and Americans,
for emotional rather than descriptive purposes.
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This commentary reviews the principle articles in the symposium, and suggests
that they collectively represent a scholarly move away from the ideological left-right
battles of the 80s and 90s towards a more apoliticized perspective on administration with a preference for legislative or administrative controls on administration over executive or judicial ones.
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Commenting on the articles by Professors Zeppos and Merrill, Professor Greenberg notes the irony that members of the federal judiciary apparently accepted the
expanded administrative state more quickly than did members of the elite bar. He
discusses the extent to which the judiciary's acceptance of the administrative state can
be explained by the experiences of New Deal insiders who became Justices or by an
ideology of judicial self-restraint.
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This Comment examines the implications of Professor Krent's article for regulatory flexibility, particularly agency decisions to waive regulations. Professor Rossi
suggests that courts should err in favor of reviewability of agency waiver decisions in
order to enhance the accountability of regulatory programs to statutory goals and to

protect against selective deregulation, favoritism, or sub silentio rulemaking in regulatory program implementation.
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In their contributions to this symposium, Professor Ronald Levin argues that step
two of the Chevron doctrine should be reformulated into traditional arbitrary-or-capricious review and Professor Edward Rubin argues that the concept of discretion
should be replaced by drawing from the theory of bureaucracy. In his Comment, Professor Gary Lawson agrees in principle with both contributions but suggests that the
proposals of Professors Levin and Rubin face serious problems of implementation.
Professor Levin's proposal would require courts to force agencies (and the courts
themselves) openly to confront questions of interpretative methodology that are perhaps better left buried, and Professor Rubin's proposal would require such substantial
changes in linguistic usage that the gains may not be worth the additional clarity that
his substitution would provide.
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This article explores the gradual expansion of federal jurisdiction under the
Hobbs Act, a statute that prohibits extortion, bribery, and robbery. Though the Act's
jurisdictional element was broadly written, judicial interpretation has reduced the effect on interstate commerce necessary to permit federal intervention to little more
than an afterthought. Through an examination of a representative case, the author
demonstrates that the courts themselves have actively contributed to the expansion of
federal jurisdiction over the last fifty years.
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